They're Still There, He's All Gone: American Fatalities in Foreign Wars and Right-Wing Radicalization at Home

Supplementary Materials

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Contents

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1 Main results

	County Level	Census Tract Level
War Fatalities	0.13^*	0.04^*
	(0.03)	(0.01)
Military Service (Post 2001)	-0.01	0.02^*
	(0.05)	(0.00)
Military Service (Pre 2001)	0.31^*	0.06^*
	(0.15)	(0.01)
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.14^*	
	(0.04)	
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.07	
	(0.06)	
Population Density	-0.03	
	(0.03)	
Graduated High School	0.11^*	0.02^*
	(0.03)	(0.00)
White Population	0.11	0.04^*
	(0.14)	(0.01)
Black Population	-0.12^*	-0.01^*
	(0.06)	(0.01)
Indigenous Population	0.09^*	0.02^*
	(0.04)	(0.00)
Asian Population	0.14^*	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.00)
Other Race Population	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.00)
Share age 18 to 65	-0.01^*	
	(0.01)	
Num. Refugees	0.03^*	
	(0.01)	
Broadband Access	0.09	
	(0.05)	
Republican Vote Share	0.08^*	
	(0.03)	
Military Base	0.02	0.05^*
	(0.04)	(0.01)
Median Income	0.16^*	
	(0.03)	
Trade Shock	-0.02	
	(0.02)	
Nonwhite Population Change	-0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.00)
Num. obs.	2950	70647
R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74	0.15
R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.67	0.03
Adj. R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74	0.11
Adj. R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.66	-0.01
Num. groups: States	47	
Num. groups: State-counties		3033

$^*p < 0.05$

Table 1.1: Models from Figure 4 in the main text

2 Videos

This section provides more detail on the videos connected to the metadata. Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of durations for videos uploaded in the United States between January 1, 2020 and January 10, 2021. The mean length of a video is 59.90 seconds, while the median is 31.10.[^10] Figure 2.1 presents the histogram of logged video duration in seconds. The data are heavily right-skewed with 7 videos over 40 minutes in length.



Figure 2.1: Distribution of video duration

We address three main points regarding the use of Parler data in this study of right-wing political behavior. First, we discuss the ethical considerations regarding the use of social media data, and outline how the ways in which we summarize and analyze the data address these concerns. Second, we address the availability and accuracy of geolocation information, and our strategies to ensure unbiased measurement of our counts of Parler video uploads at the relevant geographic units of analysis. Finally, we explore the potential issues related to the extent to which Parler video uploads are original user content, key to our claims that they represent an appropriate measure of political activity.

2.1 Ethical considerations

Many of these videos were uploaded from Parler users' homes, and as such the geolocation information constitutes potentially personally identifying information (PII). We take multiple steps to address this concern. First, our statistical results are in no way based on individual videos; the smallest unit of analysis in our dataset is a count of videos aggregated up to the census tract level. Census information is publicly available from the United States Census Bureau at units lower than the census tract level. Privacy concerns that led to changes in the 2020 census were related to reporting information about the lower-level census block group, but not the tract level, as the tract level does not contain enough information to re-identify any individuals (Long 2020). Second, our replication materials contain only counts of videos uploaded at the county and census tract level. They do not include any information about individual video uploads, including geographic coordinates, which further reduces the likelihood that any individual can be linked to a video upload.

45 CFR §46.104 (d) (4) (i) states that secondary research where "the identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens are publicly available" is exempt from IRB approval requirements. It is debatable whether the manner in which archivists obtained the Parler data meet standards for public accessibility. However, the data used in the analyses of this paper—geographic coordinates attached to video uploads—do not constitute identifiable private information. Further, the raw geolocation data are not included in our replication files. The replication files contain only counts of videos uploaded by geographic unit, which are even less identifiable. As such, we believe that this research is exempt from IRB approval requirements.

2.2 Location

There are 57,159 videos with geolocation information uploaded from the United States between January 1, 2020 and January 10, 2021. 68 of the geocoded videos were not available on the server.[1]

[1]These videos are included in the metadata, but it is not clear whether the archivists were unable to download them alongside the metadata or if they were removed after the fact.

72.31% of the 65 videos that were coded as being filmed at a rally do not appear in our analysis dataset, indicating that our same day 25 km rule is reasonably successful in excluding videos filmed at a rally. ACLED defines a protest as "individuals and groups who peacefully demonstrate against a political entity, government institution, policy, group, tradition, businesses or other private institutions" (ACLED 2019, 12), so pro-Trump rallies would not appear in ACLED unless there were counterprotesters at the event to oppose it, which likely explains the videos uploaded at rallies that were not removed by our geographic exclusion procedure. Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1 present results from models that use different geographic rules for excluding videos uploaded within a given distance of a recorded protest or riot. The results are not meaningfully different from those in Table 1.1 regardless of exclusion rule used.

The data include the latitude and longitude of a video upload, along with the time stamp, but not identification of the specific account used to upload the video. Therefore, we can not differentiate between multiple video uploads by one user and single video uploads across multiple users in the same space.

To address this concern, we perform the following analysis. We take the raw data on video uploads with their latitude and longitude, then round the latitude and longitude to varying decimal places (from one digit to four decimal places) and then drop duplicate values before we aggregate the count of videos up to the county level for the analysis. By doing so, we treat multiple videos from the same location as one video upload. Since 'same location' may have different latitudes and longitudes (for example, in a large house or office building), we vary how much we round the latitude and longitude. Whether we round the latitude and longitude to four decimal places or one decimal place, the results are the same.

Here we illustrate with a hypothetical example. Let us say that we have five videos that are uploaded at the following latitude and longitude:

- 37.9182, 75.0713
- 37.9483, 75.0913
- 37.9182, 75.0713
- 37.9082, 75.0613
- 37.8182, 75.0314

All of these geographic points are in the same county. In the main specification, this data would be aggregated (and logged) at the county level, for a total entry of five videos. However, some of these uploads occurred in proximity to each other, and it is possible that these geographically close videos are geographically close because it is one individual who is uploading multiple videos from the same general area. To address this possibility, we round the coordinates to four decimal places and then take the unique values. The transformed data looks like this:

- 37.9000, 75.1000
- 37.9000, 75.1000
- 37.9000, 75.1000
- 37.9000, 75.1000
- 37.8000, 75.0000

Now we take only the unique values, and then aggregate:

- 37.9000, 75.1000
- 37.8000, 75.0000

With this approach, our county only has two video uploads, We then use this data (along with the aggregate counts when rounding coordinates to one, two, and four decimal places) in our main regression specification. Results from this robustness check are presented in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.2 below.

As stated in the main text, there is geolocation error for about 8% of our fatalities. This results from ambiguity in matching hometown names that may have multiple matches within a state (for example, two entries for Springfield in Virginia). In our main models, we aggregate the fatalities with multiple matches by taking the mean of the latitude and longitude of the entries matched. We do this because many of the matches are for entities with overlapping territorial jurisdictions. However, in cases where this does not happen, we may be assigning a casualty to the wrong county. To address this, we run two models where we take the maximum and minimum value of the latitude and longitude for entities that have multiple locations. In effect, one model will be run on data where a casualty is attributed to Springfield, VA located on the northwestern most part of the state, while the other model will be run on data where a casualty is attributed to Springfield, VA located on the southeastern most part of the state. Results presented in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 are almost identical to our main results. This is to be expected, as the geolocation error is quite small.



Figure 2.2: Models accounting for various rules for excluding protests

	5 km	10 km	15 km	20 km
War Fatalities	0.12^*	0.12^*	0.12^*	0.13^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Military Service (Post 2001)	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Military Service (Pre 2001)	0.21	0.25	0.27	0.31^*
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.12^*	0.13^*	0.13^*	0.13^*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Population Density	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Graduated High School	0.11^*	0.11^*	0.11^*	0.11^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
White Population	0.18	0.14	0.12	0.11
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Black Population	-0.12^*	-0.12^*	-0.12^*	-0.12^*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Indigenous Population	0.10^*	0.10^*	0.10^*	0.09^*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Asian Population	0.14^*	0.15^*	0.14^*	0.14^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other Race Population	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Share age 18 to 65	-0.02^*	-0.02^*	-0.02^*	-0.02^*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. Refugees	0.04^*	0.04^*	0.03^*	0.03^*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Broadband Access	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican Vote Share	0.07^*	0.07^*	0.07^*	0.07^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Military Base	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Median Income	0.17^*	0.16^*	0.16^*	0.16^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade Shock	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nonwhite Population Change	-0.05^*	-0.04^*	-0.03^*	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Num. obs.	2950	2950	2950	2950
R^2 (fixed effects)	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.75
R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.68
Adj. R^2 (fixed effects)	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.74
Adj. R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.68	0.68	0.67	0.67
Num. groups: States	47	47	47	47

$^*p < 0.05$

Table 2.1: Models accounting for various rules for excluding protests (county level)



Figure 2.3: Models accounting for rounding of latitude and longitude

2.2.1 Community and the geographic units of analysis

In our conceptual and theoretical framework, the *community* is defined by social relationships. In our empirical analysis, the measurement of key variables — including Parler activity — can only be measured in geographic space (counties and census block groups). As noted in the main text, this creates a disconnect between the theoretical mechanisms

	One Digit	Two Digits	Three Digits	Four Digits
War Fatalities	0.08^*	0.11^*	0.11^*	0.12^*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Military Service (Post 2001)	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Military Service (Pre 2001)	0.41^*	0.25^*	0.21	0.22
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.12^*	0.08^*	0.09^*	0.10^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Population Density	-0.13^*	-0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Graduated High School	0.03	0.09^*	0.11^*	0.11^*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
White Population	-0.04	0.12	0.16	0.15
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Black Population	-0.07	-0.09	-0.10^*	-0.11^*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Indigenous Population	0.06^*	0.08^*	0.08^*	0.09^*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Asian Population	0.07^*	0.12^*	0.12^*	0.12^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other Race Population	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Share age 18 to 65	0.00	-0.01^*	-0.01^*	-0.01^*
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. Refugees	0.00	0.03^*	0.03^*	0.03^*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Broadband Access	0.10^*	0.06	0.04	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican Vote Share	0.05^*	0.06^*	0.06^*	0.06^*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Military Base	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Median Income	0.12^*	0.15^*	0.15^*	0.15^*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade Shock	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nonwhite Population Change	0.02	-0.04^*	-0.05^*	-0.05^*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. obs.	2950	2950	2950	2950
R^2 (fixed effects)	0.69	0.80	0.79	0.78
R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.60	0.74	0.73	0.72
Adj. R^2 (fixed effects)	0.68	0.79	0.79	0.78
Adj. R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.59	0.73	0.73	0.71
Num. groups: States	47	47	47	47

$^*p < 0.05$

Table 2.2: Models accounting for rounding of latitude and longitude (county level)

at the community level and the empirical analysis. Social networks that represent the core of community do not map



Figure 2.4: Models accounting for geolocation error

perfectly onto the boundaries drawn for administrative units, which creates this disconnect.

There are a number of key reasons communities and administrative units are related to, and overlap with, one another, and therefore restore confidence that the geographic units are appropriate to explore the argument empirically.

First, communities are spatially constrained, as the physical barriers and the costs of interacting increase with distance. Second, an administrative unit's institutions organize many facets of life in ways that encourage people to identify as members of a community corresponding to their boundaries, increase social interaction and community-building among residents of the administrative unit, and dedicate resources to organizing some of these groups (e.g. Such-and-such County Farmers' Association). This is a large part of why colloquially when people refer to "our community" they often reference an administrative unit or geographically defined space, even if at its core the community is the people who reside or interact in that space and identify with it.

By this, we do not imply that everyone in a county or census tract knows every other resident, with any kind of intimacy or regular interaction. But county (census tract) residents' personal connections are disproportionately contained within these administrative unit boundaries. And, while the county/census tract social networks are not complete or without gaps, they are of higher density than larger or less socially relevant boundaries. Therefore, significant events that impact county/census tract residents, such as suffering loss(es) of young residents' lives in war, will impact other residents through these community networks that relate to administrative units.

2.3 Originality

While the metadata forms the basis of our analysis, we inspect the videos in order to bolster our claims that they are original content recorded and uploaded by Parler users. 0.71% of videos have a date before Parler's launch in August, 2018, suggesting that the data are not perfect, but errors are minimal. The last date in the archive is 2021-01-10, indicating that no videos were uploaded after Parler's hosting was shut down on that date.

98.00% of geocoded videos are shot in a vertical orientation, where the image's vertical dimension is greater than its horizontal one. Professionally produced videos rarely use this 'portrait' orientation because it conflicts with both the

	Minimum Coordinates	Maximum Coordinates
Military Service (Post 2001)	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Military Service (Pre 2001)	0.33^*	0.32^*
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.13^*	0.13^*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.07	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Population Density	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Graduated High School	0.11^*	0.11^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
White Population	0.09	0.10
	(0.13)	(0.14)
Black Population	-0.12^*	-0.12
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Indigenous Population	0.09^*	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Asian Population	0.14^*	0.14^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other Race Population	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Share age 18 to 65	-0.01^*	-0.01^*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. Refugees	0.03^*	0.03^*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Broadband Access	0.08	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican Vote Share	0.08^*	0.08^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Military Base	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Median Income	0.16^*	0.16^*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade Shock	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nonwhite Population Change	0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num. obs.	2950	2950
R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74	0.74
R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.67	0.67
Adj. R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74	0.74
Adj. R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.66	0.66
Num. groups: States	47	47

$^*p < 0.05$

Table 2.3: Models accounting for geolocation error (county level)

horizontal arrangement of our eyes and over a century of established videographic convention (Pogue 2018). Thus, it is likely that a majority of the 57,181 videos in our sample represent original content recorded by the uploader.

To further assess this claim, we conduct a human review of a random 1% sample of videos with geolocation

information. Videos were coded on three criteria: whether they were filmed as a 'selfie' (subject of the video clearly holding a device and using a front-facing camera to record), whether they contained images of a television or other screen, and whether they were at a political rally.[2]

12.59% were coded as being selfies, 27.62% as footage of screens, and 11.36% as being filmed at a rally or protest. These videos frequently contained footage of television news programs, suggesting that the uploader used the recording as a way to share the message within that given segment. Other videos contained images of what appear to be residential dwellings. Taken together, these patterns indicated that a large proportion of videos were shot and uploaded in members homes. As a result, using demographic and political information measured in geographic units (census block groups, counties) is inferentially valid because many of these videos were uploaded from members' homes.

The content of the videos covered a range of topics. Many of the videos that contained footage of television news programs featured allegations that the 2020 US presidential election had been stolen or was rigged in some form. Videos also included footage of people firing firearms, attending roadside rallies and protests, and talking about perceived political enemies. Other videos contained more quotidian content such as uploaders' pets, meals, and hobbies. The content of the videos conveyed both the mix of far-right beliefs and everyday interactions that have attracted users to the platform.

To measure the duration and orientation of videos, each video was downloaded from the server and duration and orientation were obtained using `ffmpeg`. The video was then permanently deleted. The videos manually reviewed were streamed from the server and not retained locally. In many cases, a few seconds of footage was all that was necesary to classify a video on the three dimensions coded: whether it was a selfie, whether it contained footage of a television or other screen, and whether it was filmed at a rally.

[2] All of the 572 videos sampled were available for download on the server.

3 Maps

This section presents the choropleth maps in the paper in color, and with Alaska, Hawai'i, and Puerto Rico included.



(a) War fatalities (b) Parler videos

Figure 3.1: Choropleth map of Parler videos and war fatalities at the county level

(a) War fatalities (b) Parler videos

Figure 3.2: Choropleth map of Parler videos and war fatalities at the census tract level

4 Predictive power

To further assess the link between fatalities in foreign wars and far-right radicalization, we evaluate the predictive power of the covariates in our main model. Using LASSO regression for covariate selection allows researchers to discover which variables in a regression have the most the predictive power Hastie, Friedman, and Tibshirani (2009).

We perform 10-fold cross-validation (CV) to pick the λ value that minimizes mean squared error (λ is a tuning parameter in LASSO regression commonly chosen this way). Mean squared error (MSE) decreases as $ln(\lambda)$ becomes more negative until $ln(\lambda)$ reaches -7.75 (the right dotted line in Figure 4.1), where MSE is minimized. By examining the order in which covariates are dropped as $ln(\lambda)$ approaches zero, we can get a sense of their importance within the model in terms of predictive accuracy.

Figure 4.1 depicts the order in which these covariates drop out of the model. Population (`Populatn`) is the last to drop out, which makes sense given the importance of population in predicting the count of Parler videos. The number of Soldiers enlisted since 2003 (`Enls2003`) is the next to last, followed by percent without broadband internet (`pctppwbb`). War fatalities (`Casualts`) is next, but for most of the range of $ln(\lambda)$, its coefficient is significantly greater than broadband access.



Figure 4.1: LASSO coefficient estimates

War fatalities is more important to predictive accuracy than the demographic controls included in the main model, with the exception of post-2003 Army enlistment and population. This indicates a strong association between war fatalities and Parler video uploads. At the largest value of $ln(\lambda)$ where MSE is still within one standard deviation of the minimum MSE (denoted by the left dotted line in Figure 4.1), War Fatalities is the third largest coefficient.

Tables 4.1-4.5 present the coefficient estimates for each predictor in Figure 4.1. Standard errors are not presented because they are not meaningful or easily interpretable in regularized regression models (Casella et al. 2010, 377). Instead, model fit statistics, in the form of R^2 and in-sample mean squared error (MSE), are presented as regularized regression is more focused on predictive accuracy.

	$\lambda_{1.09220}$	$\lambda_{0.96438}$	$\lambda_{0.85151}$	$\lambda_{0.75186}$	$\lambda_{0.66387}$	$\lambda_{0.58618}$	$\lambda_{0.51758}$	$\lambda_{0.45701}$	$\lambda_{0.40352}$	$\lambda_{0.35630}$	$\lambda_{0.31460}$	$\lambda_{0.27778}$	$\lambda_{0.24527}$
(Intercept)	1.51	0.61	-0.18	-0.87	-1.40	-1.75	-2.06	-2.33	-2.58	-2.76	-2.87	-2.95	-3.03
Fatalities											0.02	0.05	0.07
Military Service (Post 2001)										0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03
Military Service (Pre 2001)													
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)					0.01	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.16
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)													
Population		0.09	0.16	0.23	0.28	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.37	0.38	0.39	0.39	0.39
Broadband Access													
2012 Republican Vote Share													
Military Base within 25 km													
Population Density													
Share Some College Education													
Share Age 18 to 65													
Number of Refugees													
Median Income													0.00
R^2		0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.68
MSE	1.80	1.54	1.33	1.17	1.05	0.95	0.87	0.81	0.76	0.72	0.69	0.67	0.65

Table 4.1: LASSO coefficients for different values of λ

	$\lambda_{0.21657}$	$\lambda_{0.19122}$	$\lambda_{0.16885}$	$\lambda_{0.14909}$	$\lambda_{0.13164}$	$\lambda_{0.11623}$	$\lambda_{0.10263}$	$\lambda_{0.09062}$	$\lambda_{0.08001}$	$\lambda_{0.07065}$	$\lambda_{0.06238}$	$\lambda_{0.05508}$	$\lambda_{0.04863}$
(Intercept)	-3.04	-3.03	-3.03	-2.96	-2.91	-2.87	-2.83	-2.80	-2.90	-2.99	-3.07	-3.14	-3.22
Fatalities	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Military Service (Post 2001)	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00				
Military Service (Pre 2001)													
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.18	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.20
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)				0.01	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12
Population	0.39	0.39	0.38	0.37	0.37	0.36	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Broadband Access													
2012 Republican Vote Share								0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Military Base within 25 km													
Population Density													
Share Some College Education													0.00
Share Age 18 to 65													
Number of Refugees				0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
Median Income	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.15
R^2	0.68	0.68	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
MSE	0.62	0.61	0.60	0.59	0.58	0.57	0.56	0.56	0.55	0.55	0.54	0.54	0.54

Table 4.2: LASSO coefficients for different values of λ

	$\lambda_{0.04294}$	$\lambda_{0.03792}$	$\lambda_{0.03348}$	$\lambda_{0.02956}$	$\lambda_{0.02610}$	$\lambda_{0.02305}$	$\lambda_{0.02035}$	$\lambda_{0.01797}$	$\lambda_{0.01587}$	$\lambda_{0.01401}$	$\lambda_{0.01237}$	$\lambda_{0.01092}$	$\lambda_{0.00964}$
(Intercept)	-3.31	-3.35	-3.31	-3.27	-3.23	-3.20	-3.18	-3.25	-3.32	-3.39	-3.44	-3.49	-3.53
Fatalities	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Military Service (Post 2001)													
Military Service (Pre 2001)													
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Population	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.42
Broadband Access			0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
2012 Republican Vote Share	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Military Base within 25 km												0.00	0.00
Population Density							-0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06
Share Some College Education	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Share Age 18 to 65		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Number of Refugees	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Median Income	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16
R^2	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
MSE	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52

Table 4.3: LASSO coefficients for different values of λ

	$\lambda_{0.00852}$	$\lambda_{0.00752}$	$\lambda_{0.00664}$	$\lambda_{0.00586}$	$\lambda_{0.00518}$	$\lambda_{0.00457}$	$\lambda_{0.00404}$	$\lambda_{0.00356}$	$\lambda_{0.00315}$	$\lambda_{0.00278}$	$\lambda_{0.00245}$	$\lambda_{0.00217}$	$\lambda_{0.00191}$
(Intercept)	-3.57	-3.60	-3.63	-3.65	-3.68	-3.70	-3.72	-3.73	-3.75	-3.76	-3.77	-3.78	-3.79
Fatalities	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
Military Service (Post 2001)													
Military Service (Pre 2001)													-0.00
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
Population	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.47
Broadband Access	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11
2012 Republican Vote Share	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Military Base within 25 km	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Population Density	-0.07	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10	-0.11
Share Some College Education	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Share Age 18 to 65	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Number of Refugees	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Median Income	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
R^2	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
MSE	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52

Table 4.4: LASSO coefficients for different values of λ

	$\lambda_{0.00169}$	$\lambda_{0.00149}$	$\lambda_{0.00132}$	$\lambda_{0.00116}$	$\lambda_{0.00103}$	$\lambda_{0.00091}$	$\lambda_{0.00080}$	$\lambda_{0.00071}$	$\lambda_{0.00062}$	$\lambda_{0.00055}$	$\lambda_{0.00049}$	$\lambda_{0.00043}$	$\lambda_{0.00038}$
(Intercept)	-3.83	-3.89	-3.93	-3.97	-4.00	-4.03	-4.05	-4.07	-4.09	-4.11	-4.12	-4.14	-4.15
Fatalities	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Military Service (Post 2001)	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Military Service (Pre 2001)	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.07	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Population	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.55
Broadband Access	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
2012 Republican Vote Share	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Military Base within 25 km	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Population Density	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11
Share Some College Education	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Share Age 18 to 65	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Number of Refugees	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Median Income	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
R^2	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
MSE	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52

Table 4.5: LASSO coefficients for different values of λ

5 Extreme Bounds Analysis

We also run an extreme bounds analysis to probe the robustness of our results and see if the relationship between war fatalities and parler participation is affected by the model specification. We run 8,474 regression models with 38 control variables randomly selected for inclusion. Since both our independent and dependent variables are counts, we force all models to include population as a control. The results are remarkably robust: the average effect for war fatalities on parler video uploads at the county level is 0.223. The minimum coefficient value is 0.065 and the maximum coefficient value is 0.376. In all of the models ran, the effect of war fatalities is positive and statistically significant at the .95 level.

Below we present a histogram of the effects estimated for war fatalities in Figure 5.1 and a list of additional variables we included in Table 5.1. The thick blue vertical line indicates the coefficient in our county level model presented in the main text.

War Fatalities (always included)	Rep. Exposure to Reps.	Mental Health Providers Per Cap
Military Service (After 2001)	Trade Assistance	Poor/Fair Health Per Cap
Military Base	Republican Vote Share (2016)	Adult Obesity Percent
Median Income	Ethnic Fractionalization	Diabetes Percent
Military Service (Before 2001)	Percent Unemployment	Smoking Percent
Army Enlistment Rate (After 2003)	Import Shock	Drinking Percent
Num. Refugees	Export Shock	Car Death Percent
Army Enlistment (Before 2003)	Broadband Access	Age 18 to 65 Percent
Layoffs due to Trade	Male Percent	Share Long Commute Driving
Union Membership	Rural Percent	Share Drive Alone to Work
Dem. Exposure to Dems.	High School	Share Housing Problems
Rep. Exposure to Dems	Some College	Physical Inactivity Index
Dem. Exposure to Reps.	Dentists Per Cap	Food Insecurity

Table 5.1: Candidate control variables for Extreme Bounds Analysis



Figure 5.1: Extreme bounds analysis randomly sampling from 38 control variables

6 Sensitivity Analysis

In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis to understand how our main effect of interest changes at different levels of unobserved confounding (Cinelli and Hazlett 2020). In other words, we assume that there is an omitted variable that drives the variation in both war fatalities and Parler participation, and then ask, how big would that effect have to be in order to account for the entire effect of war fatalities on Parler video uploads?

In order to provide an intuitive understanding of the magnitude of the unobserved confounding, we benchmark the unobserved confounding to be in proportion to the size of the effect of Republican vote share on Parler video uploads. In other words, we ask, if the unobserved confounding is one, or two, or x times the size of the effect of Republican vote share, what is the resulting coefficient estimate for war fatalities? We start off by benchmarking the confounding to Republican vote share because that variable has a clear theoretical and empirical link to Parler video uploads.



(a) Republican vote share

(b) Pre-2001 military service

Figure 6.1: Sensitivity analysis

Figure 6.1a shows the estimated effect of war fatalities at different proportions of potential confounding. The black triangle indicates the unadjusted effect of war fatalities (that is, the estimate effect from our main model, which is 0.13). The red diamonds indicate the estimated effect of war fatalities on Parler video uploads when the unobserved confounding is 5, 15, and 25 times the effect of Republican vote share on Parler video uploads. Even if the unobserved confounding is 15 times the effect of Republican vote share (which again is a strong predictor of Parler video uploads), the estimated effect of war fatalities is positive with a coefficient of 0.06. The unobserved confounding has to be twenty-five times the effect of Republican vote share in order to completely explain away the effect of war fatalities on Parler video uploads.

In addition, we also perform the same analysis but benchmark the unobserved confounding to be proportional to the number of veterans with pre-2001 military service in Figure 6.1b. This variable has the highest coefficient in our county level models, with a value of .0311. The plot below shows that even if the unobserved confounding is one hundred times the effect of pre-2001 military service, the effect of war fatalities on Parler video uploads attenuates to a value of 0.092. This is a remarkably robust result, and it is extremely unlikely that there is a possible unobserved confounder that jointly explains variation in both our treatment and outcome variables.

7 Descriptive Statistics

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 present descriptive statistics on the age and rank of military fatalities, respectively. Warrant officers occupy a position between non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. Junior and senior enlisted (enlisted non-commissioned officers) make up 89.01% of servicemember fatalities and have relatively equal distributions of fatalities by county. Figures 7.3 and 7.4 present descriptive statistics for the variables in Table 1.1.



Figure 7.1: Military fatalities at the county level by age



Figure 7.2: Military fatalities at the county level by rank



Figure 7.3: County level variables from Table 1.1



Figure 7.4: Census tract level variables from Table 1.1

8 Interaction Models

Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present results from model specifications that interact War fatalities with several socioeconomic, demographic, and political characteristics that may be important moderators of the association between war fatalities and right-wing radicalization. It is worth noting, first, that the overall positive association between war fatalities and radicalization holds remarkably strong across the alternative models interacting war fatalities with each factor.

For the socioeconomic and political potential moderators — median income, trade shocks, high school graduation rate, and Republican party vote share — the coefficient estimate on the War Fatalities constituent term is positive and the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is either positive and/or close to 0 and statistically indistinguishable from 0. For the models in which median income and high school graduation rate are specified as the moderator, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is slightly positive but statistically indistinguishable from 0.The interaction term in the model in which trade shock is the moderator is slightly negative, but statistically (and substantively) indistinguishable from 0. For each of these, the results suggest that the overall positive association between War Fatalities and Parler video uploads holds over the range of the data. For the model in which War Fatalities is interacted with Republican vote share, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. Together with the positive coefficient estimate on the constituent term for War Fatalities, this suggests a positive association even in communities with low Republican vote shares, and that the positive relationship increases in magnitude as Republican vote share increases.

The coefficient estimate on the War Fatalities constituent term is negative in the models interacting it with the share of the white population, with population density, and with all moderators. However, as the coefficient estimates on the constituent terms are interpreted as the association with the Parler video uploads when the moderator is held to 0, to the extent that there is any meaning to these coefficient estimates, they do not contradict the overall positive association. There are no communities in which population density is 0, very few in which the share of the white population approaches 0, and none in which the values for all moderators are 0. In each of these models, the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting that the positive association between War Fatalities and Parler video uploads increases as the share of the white population and population density increase, respectively. Therefore, in the observed range for each of these key covariates, the positive association between War Fatalities and Parler video uploads remains.

	Income	Trade	White Pop.	Education
War Fatalities	0.13*	0.13*	−0.38*	0.13*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Military Service (Post 2001)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Military Service (Pre 2001)	0.31*	0.31*	0.36*	0.32*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.13*	0.14*	0.13*	0.14*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Population Density	−0.02	−0.03	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Graduated High School	0.12*	0.11*	0.11*	0.10*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
White Population	0.10	0.11	0.03	0.10
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Black Population	−0.12*	−0.12*	−0.13*	−0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Indigenous Population	0.09	0.09*	0.09	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Asian Population	0.14*	0.14*	0.13*	0.14*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Other Race Population	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Share age 18 to 65	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01	−0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. Refugees	0.03*	0.03*	0.00	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Broadband Access	0.09	0.09	0.11*	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican Vote Share	0.08*	0.08*	0.07*	0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Military Base	0.02	0.02	−0.00	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Median Income	0.14*	0.16*	0.15*	0.15*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade Shock	−0.02	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nonwhite Population Change	0.00	−0.00	0.08*	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
War Casualties × Median Income	0.02			
	(0.02)			
War Casualties × Graduated High School				0.03
				(0.02)
War Casualties × Trade Shock		−0.01		
		(0.02)		
War Casualties × White Population			0.11*	
			(0.01)	
Num. obs.	2950	2950	2950	2950
R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.74
R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.67
Adj. R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74
Adj. R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.66
Num. groups: States	47	47	47	47

*$p < 0.05$

Table 8.1: Interaction models

	Republican	Nonwhite Pop. Change	Pop. Density	All
War Fatalities	0.14*	0.13*	−0.17*	−0.57*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Military Service (Post 2001)	−0.02	−0.01	0.00	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Military Service (Pre 2001)	0.29	0.29*	0.37*	0.35*
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.13*	0.14*	0.13*	0.12*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Population Density	−0.02	−0.02	−0.07*	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Graduated High School	0.12*	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
White Population	0.13	0.13	0.08	0.04
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Black Population	−0.12	−0.12	−0.12*	−0.13*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Indigenous Population	0.09*	0.09*	0.09	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Asian Population	0.13*	0.14*	0.13*	0.12*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other Race Population	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Share age 18 to 65	−0.01*	−0.02*	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. Refugees	0.04*	0.03*	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Broadband Access	0.08	0.08	0.11*	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republican Vote Share	0.05	0.07*	0.08*	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Military Base	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Median Income	0.15*	0.16*	0.16*	0.18*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade Shock	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nonwhite Population Change	−0.02	0.08*	0.05*	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
War Casualties × Median Income				−0.04
				(0.02)
War Casualties × Graduated High School				0.01
				(0.02)
War Casualties × Trade Shock				−0.01
				(0.02)
War Casualties × White Population				0.13*
				(0.02)
War Casualties × Republican Vote Share	0.06*			0.12*
	(0.02)			(0.02)
War Casualties × Nonwhite Population Change		−0.02*		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
War Casualties × Population Density			0.06*	0.03
			(0.01)	(0.02)
Num. obs.	2950	2950	2950	2950
R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.75
R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.68
Adj. R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74
Adj. R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.67
Num. groups: States	47	47	47	47

*$p < 0.05$

Table 8.2: Interaction models

9 Effects of Casualties under Republicans and Democrats

	Presidential Partisanship
Military Service (Post 2001)	-0.02
	(0.05)
Military Service (Pre 2001)	0.28^{*}
	(0.14)
Army Enlistment (Post 2003)	0.14^{*}
	(0.04)
Army Enlistment (Pre 2003)	0.08
	(0.06)
Population Density	-0.02
	(0.03)
Graduated High School	0.12^{*}
	(0.03)
White Population	0.14
	(0.14)
Black Population	-0.12
	(0.06)
Indigenous Population	0.10^{*}
	(0.05)
Asian Population	0.14^{*}
	(0.03)
Other Race Population	0.02
	(0.03)
Share age 18 to 65	-0.01^{*}
	(0.01)
Num. Refugees	0.03^{*}
	(0.01)
Broadband Access	0.09
	(0.05)
Republican Vote Share	0.07^{*}
	(0.03)
Military Base	0.02
	(0.04)
Median Income	0.16^{*}
	(0.03)
Trade Shock	-0.02
	(0.02)
Nonwhite Population Change	0.04^{*}
	(0.02)
War Casualties (Republican Pres)	0.02^{*}
	(0.01)
War Casualties (Democratic Pres)	0.04^{*}
	(0.02)
Num. obs.	2950
R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74
R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.67
Adj. R^2 (fixed effects)	0.74
Adj. R^2 (no fixed effects)	0.66
Num. groups: States	47

$^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 9.1: County level results accounting for president's party

10 Computing environment

- R version 4.1.2 (2021-11-01), `x86_64-apple-darwin17.0`
- Locale: `en_US.UTF-8/en_US.UTF-8/en_US.UTF-8/C/en_US.UTF-8/en_US.UTF-8`
- Running under: `macOS Big Sur 10.16`
- Matrix products: default
- BLAS: `/Library/Frameworks/R.framework/Versions/4.1/Resources/lib/libRblas.0.dylib`
- LAPACK: `/Library/Frameworks/R.framework/Versions/4.1/Resources/lib/libRlapack.dylib`
- Base packages: base, datasets, graphics, grDevices, methods, stats, utils
- Other packages: dplyr 1.0.10, forcats 0.5.1, ggplot2 3.3.6, glmnet 4.1-3, haven 2.4.3, kableExtra 1.3.4, lfe 2.8-7.1, Matrix 1.3-4, modelsummary 0.9.5, purrr 0.3.4, readr 2.1.2, RWmisc 0.1.1, sensemakr 0.1.4, sf 1.0-5, stringr 1.4.0, texreg 1.38.6, tibble 3.1.8, tidyr 1.2.0, tidyverse 1.3.1, tigris 1.5, usdata 0.2.0, xtable 1.8-4, yardstick 1.1.0
- Loaded via a namespace (and not attached): assertthat 0.2.1, backports 1.4.1, bit 4.0.4, bit64 4.0.5, broom 1.0.1, cellranger 1.1.0, checkmate 2.0.0, class 7.3-19, classInt 0.4-3, cli 3.4.0, codetools 0.2-18, colorspace 2.0-2, compiler 4.1.2, crayon 1.4.2, curl 4.3.2, data.table 1.14.2, DBI 1.1.2, dbplyr 2.1.1, digest 0.6.29, e1071 1.7-9, ellipsis 0.3.2, english 1.2-6, evaluate 0.14, fansi 1.0.2, farver 2.1.0, fastmap 1.1.0, foreach 1.5.2, foreign 0.8-81, Formula 1.2-4, fs 1.5.2, generics 0.1.2, glue 1.6.2, grid 4.1.2, gridExtra 2.3, gtable 0.3.0, here 1.0.1, hms 1.1.1, htmltools 0.5.2, httr 1.4.2, iterators 1.0.13, jsonlite 1.7.3, KernSmooth 2.23-20, knitr 1.37, labeling 0.4.2, lattice 0.20-45, lifecycle 1.0.1, lubridate 1.8.0, magick 2.7.3, magrittr 2.0.2, maptools 1.1-2, modelr 0.1.8, munsell 0.5.0, openxlsx 4.2.5, parallel 4.1.2, pillar 1.7.0, pkgconfig 2.0.3, plotmo 3.6.1, plotrix 3.8-2, proxy 0.4-26, R6 2.5.1, rappdirs 0.3.3, raster 3.5-15, Rcpp 1.0.8, readxl 1.3.1, reprex 2.0.1, rgdal 1.5-30, rio 0.5.29, rlang 1.0.5, rmarkdown 2.13, rprojroot 2.0.2, rstudioapi 0.13, rvest 1.0.2, sandwich 3.0-1, scales 1.2.1, shape 1.4.6, sp 1.4-6, splines 4.1.2, stringi 1.7.6, survival 3.2-13, svglite 2.1.0, systemfonts 1.0.3, tables 0.9.6, TeachingDemos 2.12, terra 1.5-12, tidyselect 1.1.2, tools 4.1.2, tzdb 0.2.0, units 0.7-2, utf8 1.2.2, uuid 1.0-3, vctrs 0.4.1, viridisLite 0.4.0, vroom 1.5.7, webshot 0.5.2, withr 2.4.3, xfun 0.30, xml2 1.3.3, yaml 2.2.2, zip 2.2.0, zoo 1.8-9

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